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“We need to create an adequate incentive structure for the most productive members of our 
society to ensure their contribution to the co-operative venture.” This line of reasoning has 
come to occupy centre stage in two distinct debates over recent years. First, policy makers 
put great emphasis on “the right incentives” when it comes to fiscal as well as labour policy. 
They warn of high income taxes that potentially have a negative effect on the motivation of 
the workforce and may lead to a brain drain; and they call for action against unemployment 
traps, which render idleness financially more attractive than employment. Second, several 
theories of distributive justice suggest that certain incentive payments are justified not only 
as a means to economic efficiency, but also from the perspective of what is just. The most 
prominent of these arguments is implicit in John Rawls’ famous difference principle (1999), 
which holds that “the talented” should receive a bonus to the extent that the so induced 
higher productivity can be deployed to the benefit of the worst off group in society. 
 
This short paper primarily addresses the second of these debates, but I hope that it may also 
contain at least some preliminary thoughts about how to make sense of the concept of 
incentives in contemporary political debate. In order to address the central question – “What, 
in relative terms, should we as a society pay ‘the talented’?” – I need to make explicit a set 
of assumptions on which my argument rests. Subsequently, I will introduce a distinction 
between income inequalities based on exogenous versus endogenous comparative advantages 
of workers and suggest that different theories of justice may condemn one or the other, or 
both. Finally, I will interpret and defend my own position, which regards income inequalities 
based on exogenous comparative advantage as legitimate but considers those traceable to 
endogenous comparative advantage unjust. 
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INCENTIVES AND THE MARKET – SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
 
1) An employer offers his workers a bonus if they attain a certain piece rate in production. 2) 
An employer lures a worker away from his main competitor by offering him a higher wage. 
3) A heart surgeon is paid more than the average wage in society. 4) A fall in the price of a 
certain commodity induces consumers to buy more of it. – Which of these cases contain a 
genuine incentive? What is a useful definition of the concept? In particular, what is its 
relation to the market mechanism? 
 
Ruth Grant convincingly argues that incentives “are understood better in contradistinction to 
market forces than as identical to them.” (134) Incidentally, this position is consistent with 
the historical use of the term. Early economists like Adam Smith, who believed in the 
positive nature of the unintentional consequences of the market, never used the term. It was 
only introduced when some of the failures of the market became apparent and the search for 
correctives began. An incentive so understood constitutes an intentional intervention with the 
market mechanism that induces a person to behave differently than she would have in its 
absence. This already rules out the fourth example on our above list. 
 
What does this imply for the context of income inequalities, which preoccupy us in this 
paper? As Grant spells out, “[a]n incentive is a bonus, which is defined as something more 
than usually expected, that is, something that exceeds normal compensation.” (134) 
However, this definition merely pushes the question back to the notion of “normal 
compensation.” Which level of compensation is normal and, once again, should market 
compensation be considered normal?1 
 
At this point, I believe we need to refine Grant’s analysis further by introducing the 
distinction between a perfectly competitive market on the one hand, and the various forms of 
imperfect competition on the other. By definition, agents on a perfectly competitive market 
are price takers, they are too small a buyer or seller to exert any influence on the market 
price. In other words, no one can successfully deviate from the market wage under perfect 
competition – there is no conceptual room for incentive payments understood as an 
intentional intervention with the market mechanism. 
 
The situation changes under the more realistic regime of imperfect competition. Economies 
of scale allow firms to acquire market power, which implies a certain discretion to set prices, 
including wages. However, the presence of market power blurs the distinction between 
market price and incentive payment. After all, if one employer in a given industry offers a 
bonus to his employees, his competitors might be forced to follow suit in order to prevent 
their workforce from defecting to the more lucrative jobs. If the wages in a certain industry 
or even for subgroups of employees across the industry are hiked up in this way, should we 
regard this as a result of market interaction or as the consequence of a market intervention? 
                                            
1 Note that normal compensation here is to be understood relative to different professions. It needs to 
be distinguished from the notion of average compensation used in example 3 above. 
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This is a tough call, and I do not intend to find an answer to this question here. All I want to 
claim is that in such cases, there is at least some discretionary wage setting taking place. It is 
this intentional deviation from the price vector the market forces would lead to 
independently which we will take to be the constitutive feature of incentive payments in this 
paper. 
 
If the above conceptualisation is accepted, then a normative evaluation of these discretionary 
incentive payments can be carried out without passing judgements on the resource allocation 
of the market mechanism. Since the demands of distributive justice are frequently discounted 
due to their alleged conflict with economic efficiency, this is a significant result.2 
In sum, incentive payments constitute an intentional deviation from the vector of market 
prices, and as such induce economic agents to change their behaviour.3 According to this 
definition, only the first of the four examples described above unambiguously contains an 
incentive payment; the fourth does not, the second and third only potentially do, depending 
on whether the income differential is due to market forces or discretionary wage setting.4 
Incentive payments so defined are subject to normative scrutiny. 
 
Before turning to the question what motivates employers to make such incentive payments, 
i.e. before turning to a detailed analysis of the ‘talents’ of their workers, one last clarification 
is in order. Incentive payments are made by employers. Yet, in the formulation of the central 
question of this paper, I asked what we, as a society, should pay the talented. How do these 
two perspectives fit together? The short answer is that fiscal policy allows us, via a 
democratically elected government, to correct for those incentive payments we deem 
unjustified from the perspective of distributive justice. The taxes and subsidies employed to 
this end are paradigm examples for incentives themselves. A more elaborate answer would 
have to take into account the warning from economic theory that any fiscal measure is bound 
to have repercussions on the allocation of resources, too. Given the space constraints, I allow 
myself to bracket this set of issues here. 
 
                                            
2 A lot rides on the relative magnitude of those income differentials that are due to discretionary 
decisions. I recognise that the relevance of my argument partly hinges on this point, but I do not yet 
feel in a position to say anything about the actual value of this relative magnitude that would go 
beyond mere speculation. 
3 An interesting question arises as to whether this definition of incentives overlaps with the distinction 
between compensatory and non-compensatory incentives payments used by Colin Macleod in his 
contribution to this collection. 
4 This analysis of examples 2 and 3 implies that my definition of incentives differs from that offered 
by John Rawls. Whereas Rawls would regard any income inequality, i.e. any bonus above average 
compensation as an incentive payment, my account restricts incentives payments to income 
differentials external to the market mechanism. The heart surgeon’s wage in situation 3, for instance, 
only constitutes an incentives payment to the extent that it is due to a discretionary decision, i.e. one 
that represents an intervention with market forces. 
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BETWEEN LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM AND LIBERTARIANISM 
 
An employer’s motivation to make an incentive payment is clear. He wants to improve the 
productivity of his workers at a certain task, or to induce them to perform a new task 
altogether. It is less clear whether the beneficiaries of these incentive payments have a right 
to keep this extra income. Different theories of distributive justice give different answers. 
Libertarians say that provided the distributive outcome is the result of a voluntary exchange, 
the beneficiaries are entitled to their extra income. From this perspective, incentive payments 
are morally unproblematic. 
 
John Rawls proposes a conditional acceptance of incentive payments; his difference 
principle holds that extra pay to “the talented” is justified, provided the resulting increased 
productivity can be deployed to the benefit of the worst off group in society. The most 
prominent criticism of Rawls on this issue claims that his argument requires an implausible 
restriction of the scope of the difference principle to what he calls the “basic structure of 
society” – as opposed to those principles of justice that govern individual conduct.5 
Post-Rawls liberal egalitarians, finally, would tie the legitimacy or not of incentive payments 
to the question of whether the skills that attract them are deserved or not. Ronald Dworkin, 
for instance, would presumably condemn incentive payments when the underlying skill can 
be traced to a natural talent; he would accept them as legitimate, on the other hand, when the 
underlying skill is a consequence of certain choices the individual in question has made. 
In what follows, I suggest that the Rawlsian way of framing the discussion omits an 
important distinction. The talents we are born with are not identical to the skills remunerated 
on the labour market. Taking into account this distinction opens up a new perspective on the 
legitimacy of incentive payments, one that may affect the stance of libertarians and liberal 
egalitarians on the issue, too. 
 
Whereas talents are generic and innate, skills are specific and need to be developed – 
intelligence is the paradigm example for the former category, the ability to fly an aeroplane 
illustrates the latter. There is an important difference between the two categories. Whereas 
talents are inalienable, skills are acquired. In most of today’s economies, the acquisition of 
skills is a function of a very sophisticated division of labour. In a different paper (Dietsch, 
forthcoming), I make the case that this division of labour calls for an equal distribution of the 
co-operative surplus; the latter is defined as the difference in output between the actual world 
and a counterfactual one, where individuals have to cope without the co-operation of other 
specialised labour. I will not repeat this argument here, nor does the present paper 
presuppose acceptance of its conclusion. The only insight I want to draw on is the following: 
Although skills do form just as important a part of our identity ex post, i.e. once we have 
                                            
5 Cf. Cohen (1997) and Murphy (1999) for statements of this criticism. Williams (1998) as well as 
Voorhoeve (in this collection) present a defence of Rawls. Thomas (in this collection) contains a lucid 
discussion on what is at stake in the proposed division of principles of justice into those that govern 
the basic structure and those that refer to individual conduct. 
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acquired them, society arguably has a stronger claim on their productive force than in the 
case of talents. 
In virtue of their differential talents and skills, individuals differ in their performance at 
various tasks – in the terminology of trade theory, they develop a comparative advantage in 
the production of certain goods or services. We can distinguish between an exogenous 
comparative advantage, which is based on a talent, and an endogenous comparative 
advantage, which is based on a skill.6,7 
 
So how does all of this relate to the question of incentive payments? I want to claim that 
incentive payments towards exogenous comparative advantages are legitimate from the 
viewpoint of justice, whereas incentive payments directed at endogenous comparative 
advantages are not. In other words, paying a bonus for intelligence or physical dexterity is 
fine, whereas receiving extra pay in virtue of having learned how to fly an aeroplane is not.8 
The rationale for this position is the following. Both talents and skills are the product of a 
complex interaction between innate characteristics, social factors, and individual choices. 
Yet, in a distributive context, we need to decide who is to receive the benefits that flow from 
the employment of these talents and skills. I believe two considerations should influence this 
decision. First, neither individuals nor society have any influence on individuals’ innate 
talents. Yet, since talents are an inalienable characteristic of the individual, this is where the 
resulting benefits should fall by default. Hence the legitimacy of incentive payments made 
towards exogenous comparative advantage. Second, no particular individual can claim to 
have made a significant contribution to the division of labour in society, and hence the 
resulting benefits should go to society, that is to all individuals equally. Hence the 
illegitimacy of incentive payments made towards endogenous comparative advantage. 
 
                                            
6 This, I hasten to add, is a purely conceptual distinction. In practice, we will never be able to 
disentangle the causal nexus behind particular instances of comparative advantage in order to identify 
the relative importance of talent and skill. However, this does not mean that the distinction is of no 
value. It can still inform policy decisions we make as a society. 
Cf. also the argument of liberal egalitarians. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, readily admits that we 
cannot disentangle the relative influence of innate talent, social environment, and individual choice on 
income differentials, yet he nevertheless draws normative conclusions based on this distinction. (cf. 
1981, 313) 
7 We can find first evidence of the debate over specific versus generic talent in Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, two of the most prominent classical economists. Both attributed much 
significance to the division of labour in society and the specialisation it brings with it. Yet, 
they modelled talent in different ways. Smith “proposed what is now referred to as the 
concept of endogenous comparative advantage, which implies that economies of 
specialization and division of labor may exist even if all individuals are ex ante identical, and 
that the differences in productivities between various specialists are consequences rather 
than causes of the division of labor.” (Yang, 2001, 44) Ricardo, in contrast, relied on a notion 
of exogenous comparative advantage, which amounts to the view that marketable skills are 
to a significant degree fixed by natural endowments. 
8 This does of course not preclude differences in compensation, i.e. wages, between different 
professions. It is also worth adding that the market mechanism does not make the above distinction 
between talents and skills in setting remuneration (cf. also footnote 6). I propose to employ it only 
with respect to incentive payments which, as we have seen in section 1, lie outside the market. 
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This position situates me between libertarians and liberal egalitarians. Libertarians will 
welcome the fact that an entitlement based on talents is congruent with the notion of self-
ownership. At the same time, it is clear that my account – by declaring incentive payments 
towards endogenous comparative advantage unjust – imposes substantive constraints on 
voluntary exchanges between economic agents, a feature that both libertarians and liberal 
egalitarians will be reluctant to accept. Liberal egalitarians would object to my argument that 
accepting incentive payments towards exogenous comparative advantage amounts to 
rewarding one kind of undeserved differences, namely talent.9 At the same time, the 
distributive outcome under my account may be not that far removed from what liberal 
egalitarians have in mind. One point for discussion between the liberal egalitarian and 
myself lies in tracing endogenous comparative advantages to individual and systemic factors 
respectively. Whereas the liberal egalitarian tends to emphasise individual choice, I put a lot 
of weight on the benefits from division of labour.10 
 
John Rawls, it should be added, represents a special case. His remarks about talents as 
common assets (cf. 1999, 87) and the “mutually beneficial complementarities” in a 
specialised society (2001, 76) – of the members of an orchestra, for instance – are 
sufficiently vague to be compatible with the position set out here. 
 
Before closing, let me add one clarification. I am conscious of the fact that from a bargaining 
perspective, the distinction between exogenous and endogenous comparative advantage has 
little bite. Because it takes years to train a pilot or a lawyer, the supply of these skills is very 
inelastic in the short term, allowing the incumbents to extract a premium on the labour 
market. My once again brief response to this observation is that this conflict is not surprising. 
Only under the exceptional circumstances of relatively equal initial bargaining power will 




I have argued that 1) incentive payments take place outside the logic of the market 
mechanism, and that 2) only those made towards exogenous comparative advantages are 
justified from the perspective of distributive justice. Two crucial questions have not been 
addressed in this paper. 1) What counts as market compensation and what should be 
classified as discretionary incentive payments? 2) How significant are exogenous and 
endogenous comparative advantages respectively? 
Finally, can the above discussion help further our understanding of the use of incentives in 
contemporary politics? One insight would have to be that the short-term orientation of 
                                            
9 Cf. the last paragraph for why I disagree. 
10 For an interesting justification of incentive payments open to liberal egalitarianism, cf. Colin 
Macleod’s contribution to this collection. On his argument, incentive payments made towards 
endogenous comparative advantage may be justified under non-ideal circumstances, even when their 
recipients are not entitled to them. 
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politics caught in electoral cycles certainly diminishes the chances of incentive payments 
towards endogenous comparative advantage being taxed away. The strong bargaining 
position of the skilled translates unchecked into growing income inequalities between groups 
of different qualification, most prominently those with a university degree compared to those 
without. 
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